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All use suincrease participation in employment programs and raise their future
employment and earnings. Previously employed individuals experi-
ence lasting negative employment effects. These findings demonstrate
that time spent in prison with a focus on rehabilitation can be preven-
tive for a large segment of the criminal population.I. IntroductionOver the past several decades, incarceration rates have risen dramatically
in many developed countries. In the United States, for example, the incar-
ceration rate has increased from 220 per 100,000 residents in 1980 to
more than 700 per 100,000 in 2012. In Europe, the increases (and levels)
tend to be smaller but still substantial, with the average incarceration rate
per 100,000 residents rising from 62 in 1980 to 112 in 2010 inWestern Eu-
ropean nations.1 These increases raise important questions about how
well ex-convicts reintegrate into society after incarceration and, in partic-
ular, whether they return to a life of crime. Prison time could convince
offenders that crime does not pay or rehabilitate them by providing voca-
tional and life skills training. Conversely, prison time could cause human
capital to depreciate, expose offenders to hardened criminals, or limit op-
portunities due to employment discrimination or societal stigma. Indeed,
the effects of incarceration could vary in magnitude and sign, depending
on a prisoner’s background (e.g., work history) as well as prison condi-
tions (e.g., availability of prison programs and sentence lengths).
Understanding whether and in what situations time spent in prison is
criminogenic or preventive has proven challenging for several reasons.
One problem is data availability. The ideal data set would be a long and
representative panel with individual-level information on criminal behav-
ior and labormarket outcomes. Inmany countries, however, the required
data sources cannot be accessed and linked together. Anothermajor chal-
lenge is the threat to identification from correlated unobservables. While
ex-convicts have relatively high rates of criminal activity and weak labor
market attachment, these correlations could be driven by their unob-
served characteristics as opposed to the experience of being in prison.
Because of these challenges, evidence on the causal effects of incarcer-
ation is scarce. Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson (2009, 115), in their review ar-
ticle, summarize the state of the literature well: “Remarkably little is
known about the effects of imprisonment on reoffending. The existing
research is limited in size, in quality, [and] in its insights into why a prisonhese figures come from the World Prison Brief (Walmsley 2016). The Western Euro-
countries used to construct the population-weighted average include Austria, Bel-
, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
etherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1271term might be criminogenic or preventative.”Our paper overcomes both
the data and the identification challenges in the context of Norway’s crim-
inal justice system, offering new insights into how imprisonment affects
subsequent criminal behavior.
Our work draws on two strengths of the Norwegian environment. First,
by linking several administrative data sources, we are able to construct a
panel data set containing complete records of the criminal behavior and
labor market outcomes of every Norwegian. Second, we address threats
to identification by exploiting the random assignment of criminal cases
to Norwegian judges who differ systematically in their stringency. In our
baseline specification, we measure judge stringency as the average incar-
ceration rate in other cases a judge has handled. This serves as an instru-
ment for incarceration since it is highly predictive of the judge’s decision
in the current case but, as we document, is uncorrelated with observable
case characteristics.
Our paper offers three sets of results. First, imprisonment discourages
further criminal behavior. Using our measure of judge stringency as an
instrument, we estimate that incarceration lowers the probability of
reoffending within 5 years by 29 percentage points and reduces the cor-
responding number of criminal charges per individual by 11. These re-
ductions are not simply due to an incapacitation effect. We find sizable
decreases in reoffending probabilities and cumulative charged crimes
even after defendants are released from prison.
Second, bias due to selection on unobservables, if ignored, leads to the
erroneous conclusion that time spent in prison is criminogenic. Consis-
tent with existing descriptive work, our ordinary least squares (OLS) es-
timates show positive associations between incarceration and subsequent
criminal behavior. This is true even when we control for a rich set of de-
mographic and crime category controls. Using the panel structure of our
data reduces the estimates somewhat, but there are noticeable changes in
crime and employment in the year prior to the court case, raising con-
cerns about the validity of offender fixed effects or lagged dependent var-
iablemodels. In contrast, our instrumental variables (IV) estimates, which
address the issues of selection bias and reverse causality, find that incarcer-
ation is strongly preventive formany individuals on both the extensive and
the intensive margins of crime.
Third, the reduction in crime is driven by individuals who were not
working prior to incarceration. Among these individuals, imprisonment
increases participation in programs directed at improving employability
and reducing recidivism, and it ultimately raises employment and earn-
ings while discouraging criminal behavior.2 The effects of incarceration2 Since we observe charges and not actual crimes committed, it is in theory possible that
ex-convicts do not, in fact, reduce their criminal activity but rather learn how to avoid being
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Allfor this group are large and economically important. Imprisonment causes
a 35 percentage point increase in participation in job training programs
for the previously nonemployed, andwithin 5 years, their employment rate
increases by 36 percentage points. At the same time, the likelihood of re-
offending within 5 years is cut in half (by 43 percentage points), and the
average number of criminal charges falls by 18. A very different pattern
emerges for individuals who were previously attached to the labor market.
Among this group, which comprises roughly half of our sample, there is no
significant effect of incarceration on either the probability of reoffending
or the number of charged crimes. Moreover, they experience an immedi-
ate 30 percentage point drop in employment due to incarceration, and
this effect continues out to 5 years. This drop is driven almost entirely by
defendants losing their job with their previous employer while they are
in prison. These heterogeneous effects based on prior employment status
are important to keep in mind when interpreting our results.
Taken together, our findings have important implications for ongoing
policy debates over the growth in incarceration rates and the nature of
prison. A natural question is whether the positive effects from imprison-
ment found inNorway pass a cost-benefit test. While it is difficult to quan-
tify both costs and benefits, rough calculations presented at the end of
the paper suggest that the high rehabilitation expenditures in Norway
are more than offset by the corresponding benefits to society.
Our estimates indicate that the high rates of recidivism among ex-
convicts is due to selection and not a consequence of the experience of
being in prison. Indeed, the Norwegian prison system is successful in dis-
couraging crime and encouraging employment largely because of changes
in the behavior of individuals who were not working prior to incarcer-
ation. These individuals had no job to lose and low levels of education and
work experience. Norwegian prisons offer them access to rehabilitation
programs, job training, and reentry support. Upon release, these previ-
ously unemployed individuals becomemore attached to the formal labor
market and find crime relatively less attractive. In contrast, for individuals
with some attachment to the labor market, many of them had an actual
job to lose and human capital to depreciate by going to prison. These
negative effects may well offset any positive impacts of rehabilitation
and therefore help explain why incarceration does not seem tomaterially
affect their criminal behavior or labor market outcomes.
Our paper contributes to a large literature across the social sciences on
how incarceration affects both recidivism and future employment.Much of
this literature focuses on incapacitation effects, finding reductions in crimecaught while in prison. The fact that incarceration increases formal sector employment,
which is a time substitute for criminal activity, suggests that this explanation is unlikely.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1273while offenders are in prison.3 There is less evidence on longer-term re-
cidivism, and the findings are mixed. In terms of labor market outcomes,
OLS studies usually find either negative or no effect on earnings and
employment.4 More sophisticated work uses panel data and offender
fixed effects to minimize selection issues. For recidivism, there are fewer
studies using this approach and the evidence is mixed, while for labor mar-
ket outcomes, a handful of studies find either no impact or a negative
effect.5
More closely related to our paper, some recent work has relied on the
quasi-random assignment of judges to study the effects of incarceration.6
While each of these studies uses data from theUnited States, the findings
are mixed. Kling (2006) presents results suggesting that time in prison
improves labor market outcomes after release, although the IV estimates
based on quasi-random assignment of judges are too imprecise to draw
firm conclusions. Green and Winik (2010) and Loeffler (2013) report no
detectable effects of incarceration on recidivism, whereas Aizer and Doyle
(2015) find that juvenile incarceration results in lower high school comple-
tion rates and higher adult incarceration rates. Mueller-Smith (2015) uses
data from Texas to investigate the impacts of adult incarceration and re-
ports that incarceration increases recidivism rates andworsens labormarket
outcomes.
There are several possible reasons why no consensus has emerged as to
how well ex-convicts reintegrate into society. While quasi-random assign-
ment of judges can be useful to address concerns over correlated unob-
servables, there remain issues that could bias the estimates. In Green and
Winik (2010), for instance, the estimation sample is small and the instru-
ment is weak, which may lead to severe bias in the IV estimates. Mueller-
Smith (2015) additionally explores the importance of two other issues.3 Recent studies in economics isolating incapacitation effects include those by Owens
(2009), Buonanno and Raphael (2013), and Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014). We refer
to Chalfin and McCrary (2017) for a recent review of the extensive literature on criminal
deterrence.
4 For example, Brennan and Mednick (1994), Gottfredson (1999), and Bernburg,
Krohn, and Rivera (2006) all reach different conclusions for recidivism. For a summary
of observational research on labor market outcomes, see Western, Kling, and Weiman
(2001).
5 See Freeman (1992) and Western and Beckett (1999) for early papers using panel
data. Other evidence based on fixed effects or event study design include Waldfogel
(1994), Grogger (1995), Kling (1999), and Skardhamar and Telle (2012).
6 Similar designs in related contexts include studies by Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang (2018)
and Stevenson (2018), who use the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail
judges to estimate the causal effects of pretrial detention, and Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2013), who investigate the use of electronic monitoring as an alternative to prison. For
studies using quasi-random assignment of examiners or judges in contexts other than
crime, see, e.g., Doyle (2007, 2008), Belloni et al. (2012), Doyle et al. (2012), Maestas, Mul-
len, and Strand (2013), Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad (2014), French and Song (2014),
Dobbie and Song (2015), and Autor et al. (2019).
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AllHe argues in his setting that standard IV estimates could be biased be-
cause of violation of the exclusion and monotonicity assumptions. To as-
sess the relevance and validity of our instrument, we therefore perform a
number of checks, all of which suggest that our instrument is strong, is as
good as randomly assigned, and satisfies exclusion and monotonicity.
Another possible explanation for the lack of consensus is that incarcer-
ation effects could vary depending on a prisoner’s background or prison
conditions. As documented later, prisoners in Norway have observable
characteristics that are broadly similar to prisoners in many other coun-
tries. Instead, what is quite distinct, especially compared with the United
States, is the prison system. In Scandinavian countries like Norway, the
prison system focuses on rehabilitation, preparing inmates for life on the
outside.7 This is done in part by investing in education and training pro-
grams but also through extensive use of open prisons, in which prisoners
are housed in low-security surroundings and allowed frequent visits to
families while electronically monitored.8 In comparison, in many other
countries rehabilitation has taken a back seat in favor of prison policies
emphasizing punishment and incapacitation. In the United States, a piv-
otal point was the 1974Martinson report, concluding that nothing works
in rehabilitating prisoners (Martinson 1974; Lipton,Martinson, andWilks
1975).While influential, leading criminology scholars have questioned the
evidence base for this conclusion (e.g., see the review in Cullen 2005). Our
study serves as a proof of concept demonstrating that time spent in prison
with a focus on rehabilitation can indeed be preventive.9
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section pro-
vides background on theNorwegian court system, describes how criminal
cases are assigned to judges, and outlines the baseline IV model. Sec-
tion III presents our data. This section also describes similarities and dif-
ferences in the criminal population and the criminal justice system of
Norway versus other countries. In section IV, we discuss our instrument7 A recent New York Times article summarizes the system’s rehabilitative aims: “The goal
of the Norwegian penal system is to get inmates out of it . . . ‘Better out than in’ is an un-
official motto of the Norwegian Correctional Service . . . It works with other government
agencies to secure a home, a job and access to a supportive social network for each inmate
before release” (Benko 2015).
8 Other countries are trying open prisons and finding positive results (Mastrobuoni and
Terlizzese 2014).
9 The existing evidence base is scarce and does not answer our research question of
whether and in what situations imprisonment as compared with not being incarcerated
is preventive or criminogenic. Kuziemko (2013) uses data on inmates in Georgia and finds
that access to parole boards increases participation in rehabilitation programs and reduces
recidivism. There are also a few randomized controlled trials in the United States focusing
primarily on postrelease training and education programs for ex-convicts. These studies
have estimated zero or small (and often imprecise because of small samples) effects on
long-term labor market and recidivism outcomes (see Visher, Winterfield, and Coggeshall
2005; Redcross et al. 2012; Cook et al. 2015).
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1275and its validity. Section V presents our main results for recidivism, while
section VI documents the important role of employment in reducing re-
cidivism. Section VII concludes.II. Research DesignIn this section, we describe our research design. We begin by reviewing
key aspects of the criminal justice system in Norway, documenting how
criminal court cases are randomly assigned to judges. We then describe
how to use this randomization to estimate the effects of incarceration
on subsequent criminal behavior and labor market outcomes.A. The Norwegian Court SystemThe court system in Norway consists of three levels: the district court, the
court of appeals, and the supreme court. The vast majority of cases are
settled at the district court level. In this paper, we focus on criminal cases
tried in one of the 87 district courts in existence at one time or another in
Norway during the period of our study. The largest district court is located
in Oslo and has around 100 judges, while the smallest courts have only a
few judges.
There are two types of professional judges in district courts: regular
judges and deputy judges. Regular judges are appointed civil servants and
can be dismissed only for malfeasance. One of the regular judges is ap-
pointed as chief judge to oversee the administration of the local court.
In 2010 there were 370 full-time regular judges (including chief judges);
their average age was 53, and 62% were male. Deputy judges, like regular
judges, are also law school graduates but are appointed to a court for a
limited period of time, which cannot exceed 3 years (5 years in Oslo).
Deputy judges have a somewhat different caseload compared with regu-
lar judges, as discussed in section II.B. Not all deputy judges become reg-
ular judges, and those who do typically need several of years of experi-
ence in other legal settings before applying for and being appointed as
a regular judge.
Criminal cases are classified into two broad types: confession and non-
confession cases. Both types are settled by trial (as opposed to the United
States, which has plea bargains). In confession cases, the accused has con-
fessed to the police/prosecutor before his case is assigned to a judge. The
confession is entered into evidence, but the prosecution is not absolved
of the duty to present a full case, and the judge may still decide that the
defendant is innocent.10 In practice, most confession cases are relatively10 These rules apply to most civil law systems, in contrast to common law systems, where a
majority of criminal cases are settled by confession and plea bargain rather than by a trial.
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Allstraightforward. To save on time and costs, they are therefore heard by a
single professional judge who decides on sentencing. Nonconfession cases
are heard by a panel of one professional and two lay judges or, in the case
of extremely serious crimes, by two professional judges and three lay
judges. The lay judges are individuals chosen from the general popula-
tion to serve for a limited 4-year term. The professional judge presides
over the case, while the lay judges participate on the questions of guilt
and sentencing. As opposed to professional judges, lay judges hear only
a few cases a year.11
One advantage of the Norwegian criminal justice system compared
with some other countries is that it has no plea bargaining. For example,
in theUnited States, criminal defendants often know their assigned judge
before deciding whether to plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sen-
tence. The fact that these pretrial strategies are not taking place in our
setting makes the interpretation of our IV estimates easier to interpret
(see Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang 2018). Moreover, in Norway, the judge
handling the criminal court case is not necessarily the same as the pretrial
custody judge, with random reassignment of judges for the court case.12
Figure 1 charts how suspected crimes are processed in Norway’s crim-
inal justice system. The figure reports percentages for the period 2005–9.
If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they file a formal report. A
public prosecutor then decides whether the individual should be charged
with a crime as well as whether the case should proceed to a court trial. AsFIG. 1.—Processing of suspected crimes in Norway’s criminal justice system. The sample
consists of all criminal cases reported to the police in Norway between 2005 and 2009.11 Lay judges must satisfy certain requirements, such as not having a criminal record and
not working in certain occupations (e.g., police officer). In a municipal district, the pool of
lay judges is usually between 30–60 individuals. Lay judges are partially compensated for
days absent from work if not covered by their employer. We do not observe the identify
of the lay judges in our data, but since they are randomly assigned to judges within a court,
they should not create any bias in our estimates.
12 We verified the random reassignment of judges by comparing the actual probability of
receiving the same judge in both the court case and the custody case relative to the coun-
terfactual probability from random assignment. The difference was close to zero and not
statistically significant.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1277reported in the figure, about half of police reports lead to a formal crim-
inal charge. Of these charged cases, the public prosecutor advances 43%
of them to a trial. The other charged cases are dismissed, directly assigned
a fine, or sent to mediation by the public prosecutor. Around 60% of the
cases that proceed to trial are nonconfession cases. Once a case proceeds
to trial, it is assigned to a judge. If the judge finds the accused guilty, he or
she can assign a combination of possible punishments that are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. In the figure, we show percentages based on the
strictest penalty received, so that the percentages add up to 100%. Just
over half of cases result in incarceration, with probation, community ser-
vice, andfines combined accounting for 44%of outcomes. In a small frac-
tion of cases (5%), the defendant is found not guilty.B. Assignment of Cases to JudgesIn Norway, the law dictates that cases be assigned to judges according to
the principle of randomization (Bohn 2000; NOU 2002). The goal is to
treat all cases ex ante equally and prevent outsiders from influencing the
process of the criminal justice system. In practice, cases are assigned by
the chief judge to other judges on a mechanical, rotating basis based
on the date a case is received. Each time a new case arrives, it is assigned
to the next judge on the list, with judges rotating between criminal and
civil cases.13
There are some special instances where the assignment of cases does
not follow the principle of randomization. These include cases involving
juvenile offenders, extremely serious cases that require two professional
judges, and complex cases expected to take a longer time to process, all
of which can be assigned to more experienced judges. The Norwegian
Department of Justice provides guidelines on the types of cases that can
be nonrandomly assigned, and the Norwegian Courts Administration has
flagged such cases in our data set. While all other cases are randomly as-
signed, some case types can be assigned to only regular judges, and deputy
judges are assigned relatively more confession cases. This means that ran-
domization occurs within judge type but not necessarily across judge types.
Therefore, to have a sample of randomly assigned cases to the same pool of
judges, we (1) exclude the special cases described above and (2) focus on
regular judges handling nonconfession cases.
A key to our design is that not only are judges randomly assigned but
also they differ in terms of their propensity to incarcerate defendants. In13 Baard Marstrand at the Norwegian Courts Administration verified that district courts
are required to randomly assign cases to judges, except in a few instances, which we discuss
in the text. We also checked with both the Bergen District Court (the second largest court,
behind Oslo) and the Nedre Telemark District Court (a medium-sized court) that they fol-
low the principle of randomization.
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Allour baseline specification, we measure the strictness of a judge on the
basis of their incarceration rate for other randomly assigned cases they
have handled, including both past and future confession and noncon-
fession cases and not just those cases that appear in our estimation sam-
ple. Our estimation sample has 500 judges, each of whom have presided
over an average of 258 randomly assigned court cases. In our baseline spec-
ification, our measure of judge stringency is calculated as the leave-out
mean judge incarceration rate. When using this measure, we always con-
dition on fully interacted court and year fixed effects to account for the
fact that randomization occurs within the pool of available judges. This
controls for any differences over time or across judicial districts in the
types of criminals or the strictness of judges. In a number of specification
checks, we show robustness of the results to how we measure judge strict-
ness (see sec. V.C).
Table 1 verifies that judges in our baseline sample are randomly assigned
to cases. The first column regresses incarceration on a variety of variables
measured before the court decision. It reveals that demographic, type of
crime, and past work and criminal history variables are highly predictive of
whether a defendant will be incarcerated, withmost being individually sig-
nificant. In column 3, we examine whether our measure of judge strin-
gency can be predicted by this same set of characteristics. This is the same
type of test that would be done to verify random assignment in a random-
ized controlled trial. There is no statistically significant relationship be-
tween the judge stringency variable and the various demographic, crime
type, and labor market variables. The estimates are all close to zero, with
none of them being statistically significant at the 5% level. The variables
are not jointly significant either (p 5 :920). This provides strong evidence
that criminal court cases are randomly assigned to judges in our sample,
conditional on fully interacted court and year fixed effects.
It is natural to ask why some judges are more likely to incarcerate than
others. While we do not observe personal characteristics of judges in our
data for privacy reasons, we can measure how many cases they have han-
dled. Using an OLS regression with the same controls as in table 1, we
find no relationship between the number of cases handled and judge
stringency in our baseline sample. While there may be a variety of other
reasons a judge is more or less likely to incarcerate, it is important to keep
inmind that as long as judges are randomly assigned, the underlying rea-
sons should not matter for our analysis.C. IV ModelWe are interested in the causal effects of incarceration on subsequent
criminal behavior and labor market outcomes. This can be captured by
the regression modelThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Age .0036*** .0004 2.0000 .0000 32.65 11.36
Female 2.0520*** .0071 2.0011 .0007 .106 .308
Foreign born .0035 .0062 .0007 .0007 .135 .342
Married, year t 2 1 2.0234*** .0117 2.0017 .0012 .111 .314
Number of children,
year t 2 1 2.0011 .0032 .0002 .0004 .783 1.244
High school degree,
year t 2 1 .0109 .0083 .0004 .0009 .172 .377
Some college,
year t 2 1 2.0532*** .0130 2.0013 .0015 .046 .209
Violent crime .0843*** .0085 .0015 .0011 .256 .437
Property crime 2.0357*** .0109 .0011 .0012 .139 .346
Economic crime 2.0401*** .0116 .0018 .0015 .113 .316
Drug related 2.0484*** .0112 2.0000 .0013 .119 .324
Drunk driving .0745*** .0128 .0002 .0014 .071 .257
Other traffic 2.0453*** .0127 .0003 .0012 .087 .281
Missing demographic
information 2.2971** .1386 2.0088 .0150 .030 .170
Past work and criminal
history:
Employed, year t2 1 .0284*** .0082 .0002 .0008 .352 .478
Ever employed,
years t 2 2
to t 2 5 2.0016 .0083 .0001 .0009 .470 .499
Charged, year t 2 1 .0498*** .0074 .0003 .0008 .459 .498
Ever charged,
years t 2 2
to t 2 5 .0447*** .0078 2.0008 .0010 .627 .483
Incarcerated,
year t 2 1 .1423*** .0105 .0002 .0013 .139 .346
Ever incarcerated,
years t 2 2
to t 2 5 .1690*** .0095 .0009 .0010 .279 .448
F-statistic for joint test 94.99 .593
p -value .000 .920This conte
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ww.jouNote.—Shown is the baseline sample of nonconfession criminal cases processed in
2005–9. All estimations include controls for court  court entry year fixed effects. Reported
F -statistic refers to a joint test of the null hypothesis for all variables. The omitted category for
education is “Less than high school, year t2 1,” and the omitted category for type of crime is
“Other crimes.” Standard errors are two-way clustered at the judge and defendant level.
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AllYi,t 5 bt Ii,0 1 X
0
i vt 1 hi,t , (1)
where bt is the parameter of interest, Ii,0 is an indicator variable equal to 1
if defendant i is sentenced to prison in period 0 (normalized to be the
time of the court decision), Xi is a vector of control variables, and Yi,t is
the dependent variable of interest measured at some point t after individ-
ual i’s court decision (e.g., cumulative criminal charges 5 years after the
court decision). As demonstrated in table 1, the incarcerated and non-
incarcerated groups are far from comparable. This raises concerns of se-
lection bias in OLS estimation of bt. Our research design addresses this
concern by exploiting that cases are randomly assigned to judges (condi-
tional on year and court fixed effects) and that some judges are systemat-
ically more lenient that others. Taken together, this leads to random var-
iation in the probability that an individual will be incarcerated depending
onwhich judge they are assigned to.We utilize this exogenous variation in
Ii,0 to draw inference about the causal effects of incarceration.
Our main analysis is based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) estima-
tion of bt, with equation (1) as the second-stage equation and a first-stage
equation specified as
Ii,0 5 gZj ið Þ 1 X
0
id 1 ni,0, (2)
where the scalar variable Zj(i) denotes the stringency of judge j assigned
to defendant i’s case. Under the assumptions of instrument exogeneity
and monotonicity, the 2SLS estimand can be interpreted as a positive
weighted average of the causal effect of incarceration among the sub-
group of defendants who could have received a different incarceration
decision had their case been assigned to a different judge.
Given the quasi-random assignment of cases to judges, the key chal-
lenge to instrument exogeneity is that trial decisions aremultidimensional,
with the judge deciding on incarceration, fines, community service, pro-
bation, and guilt. In section V.E, we examine this threat to the exclusion
restriction, showing that our estimates do not change appreciably when
we augment our baseline model to either control for judge stringency
in other dimensions or include and instrument for other trial sentencing
decisions. In the presence of heterogeneous effects, onemay also be wor-
ried about the monotonicity assumption; that is, defendants who are in-
carcerated by a lenient judge would also need to be incarcerated by a
stricter judge, and vice versa for nonincarceration. In section IV.B, we im-
plement two sets of tests, both of which indicate thatmonotonicity is likely
to hold. On top of these challenges to identification, onemay also be wor-
ried about exactly how to measure judge stringency Zj(i) and perform sta-
tistical inference. For ourmain specifications, wemeasure Zj(i) as the leave-
out mean incarceration rate, which omits case i, that is, the average
incarceration rate in other cases a judge has handled. In section V.C, weThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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proach. We also make sure the conclusions do not change materially if we
exclude judges with relatively few cases or if we use confidence intervals
that remain valid whether or not instruments are weak. In appendix D
(apps. A–D are available online), we discuss potential challenges to estima-
tion and inference in the random judge setting and perform a series of
Monte Carlo simulations to assess the finite sample performance of the
2SLS estimator depending on how one measures Zj(i). These simulations
lend support to the reliability of the statistical inference we perform when
measuring Zj(i) as the leave-out mean incarceration rate.
In most of our analysis, we perform 2SLS estimation of equations (1)
and (2) using the entire sample of all defendants in nonconfession, ran-
domly assigned cases. However, to interpret the results and inform pol-
icy, it would be useful to move beyond the resulting average causal effect
and estimate the heterogeneous effect of incarceration along a variety of
dimensions. One common approach to explore heterogeneity in effects
would be to estimate the 2SLSmodel separately by subgroups. Ideally, we
would want to split the sample by case characteristics (e.g., crime type,
first-time vs. repeated offender), demographics (e.g., age, ethnicity,
prior employment status) or both. However, for reasons of sample size
and power, we cannot cut the data too finely. Instead, we focus attention
on how effects differ by prior employment status, as the question of whether
incarceration is criminogenic or preventive is likely to depend strongly
on whether a defendant has an actual job to lose and human capital to
depreciate by going to prison (see sec. VI). In addition to this subsample
estimation, we explore heterogeneity in effects according to unobserv-
ables. To do so, we first estimate the marginal treatment effects (MTEs)
and then use these estimates to learn about the average treatment effect
(ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the aver-
age treatment effect on the untreated (ATUT). The results from the sub-
sample estimation and MTE analysis are reported in section V.D.III. Data and Background
A. Data and Sample SelectionOur analysis employs several data sources that we can link through unique
identifiers for each individual. Informationon the court cases comes from
theNorwegian Courts Administration. The data set contains information
for all court cases over the period 2005–14. We observe the start and end
dates of every trial, various case characteristics, the verdict, and unique
identifiers for both judges, defendants, and district courts. We link this
information with administrative data that contain complete records for
all criminal charges, including the type of crime, when it took place, andThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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Allsuspected offenders. These data can be additionally linked to the prison
register with information on actual time spent in prison. Wemerge these
data sets with administrative registers provided by Statistics Norway, using
a rich longitudinal database that covers every resident from 1967 to 2016.
For each year, it contains individual demographic information (includ-
ing sex, age, and number of children), socioeconomic data (such as years
of education, earnings, employment), as well as geographical and firm
identifiers.
To construct our baseline sample, we exclude the nonrandomly as-
signed cases described in section II.B and focus on regular judges han-
dling nonconfession cases.14 This yields a sample of randomly assigned
cases to the same pool of judges. Excluding the nonrandomly assigned
cases is straightforward, as these cases are flagged in our data set. Our
baseline sample further restricts the data set to judges who handle at least
50 randomly assigned confession or nonconfession cases between the
years 2005 and 2014 (i.e., at least 50 of the cases used to construct our
judge stringency instrument). Since we will be including court  year of
case registration fixed effects in all our estimates, we also limit the data
set to courts that have at least two regular judges in a given year. Ourmain
estimation sample uses cases decided between 2005 and 2009 so that each
defendant can be followed for up to 5 years after decision, while the judge
stringency instrument is based on the entire period from2005 to 2014. Ta-
ble A1 (tables A1, A2, B1–B16, C1–C3, D1–D5 are available online) shows
how the various restrictions affect the number of cases, defendants, judges,
and courts in our sample. After applying our restrictions, the baseline es-
timation sample includes 33,548 cases, 23,373 unique defendants, and
500 judges.B. Descriptive StatisticsWenow provide some summary statistics for defendants, crime types, and
judges. Panel A in table A2 shows that defendants are relatively likely to be
young, singlemen. They also have little education, low earnings, and high
unemployment prior to the charge, with less than40%of defendants work-
ing in the prior year. Serial offenders are common, with 38% of defen-
dants having been charged for a different crime in the prior year. Panel B
reports the fraction of cases by primary crime category. Around one-fourth
of cases involve violent crime, while property, economic, and drug crime
each comprise a little more than 10% of crimes. Drunk driving, other traf-
fic offenses, and miscellaneous crime make up the remainder.14 In comparison, judges are fairly similar in their incarceration rates for confession cases.
Replicating the IV specification of col. 3 of table 4 using only confession cases, we estimate an
effect of20.333 (standard error of 0.311). While the magnitude of the coefficient is similar,
the standard error is more than three times larger.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1283In figure 2, we document the typical employment and crime levels for
our sample over time. Panel A plots the probability a defendant has any
paid employment in a given month during the 10-year period surround-
ing their court decision. There are separate lines for defendants who are
sentenced to incarceration versus not sentenced to incarceration. The
first fact that emerges is that prior to the court decision, labormarket par-
ticipation is low for both groups, with less than 30% of defendants work-
ing in anymonth. Employment rates for the incarcerated group are a few
percentage points lower; to ease comparison of changes over time, the
graph also adjusts the nonincarcerated group’s employment line to be
the same as the incarcerated group’s at the beginning of the sample pe-
riod. Both groups havemonthly employment rates that increase over time,
reflecting the fact that employment rises as individuals become older.
Themost striking pattern in the graph is the divergence in employment
between the incarcerated and the nonincarcerated defendants around
the time of the court decision. The positively sloped pretrends for both
groups are fairly similar up until about 1 year before the court decision
date. However, around 12 months prior to the decision, the incarcerated
line trends sharply downward. This could be the result of incarcerated in-
dividuals beingmore likely to lose their jobs and turn to crime prior to the
court’s decision or, alternatively, incarcerated individuals beingmore likely
to commit crime and lose their jobs as a result. Either way, the divergent
trends prior to treatment suggest that the two groups are not comparable.
The downward trend continues until about 6 months after the decision,
at which point it resumes its upward trend. Comparing the two lines re-
veals a sizable and stubbornly persistent drop in employment for the in-
carcerated group relative to the nonincarcerated.15 Similar patterns are
found for earnings and hours worked (see fig. B1; figs. A1, A2, B1–B7
are available online).
In panel B of figure 2, we plot the probability an individual is charged
with at least one crime in a month over time. The figure reveals that both
types of defendants have a high propensity to commit a crime. Five years
before the court decision, defendants who will be incarcerated have a
10%chance of committing a crime in amonth comparedwith 7% for those
who will not be incarcerated. Examining the pretrends, there is a large
jump around the court decision for both groups, since in order to have
a court decision an individual must first be charged with a crime. While
the two groups have similar trends for much of the preperiod, they begin15 There are several reasons why employment does not drop to zero after the court de-
cision for those sentenced to prison. First, the average waiting time after a court decision
before being sent to prison is around 5 months, and many prison stays are short. Second,
the receipt of employment-related payments while in prison, such as vacation pay, shows up
as working for pay in our data set. Third, a small number of individuals are allowed to work
outside of prison while incarcerated.
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AllFIG. 2.—Employment and criminal charges before and after month of court decision.
The baseline sample consists of 33,548 nonconfession criminal cases processed in 2005–
9. Defendants are categorized into two groups, either incarcerated (solid black line) or
not incarcerated (dashed black line). To ease the comparison of trends, in each panel
we normalize the level of the not incarcerated group’s outcomes to the level of the incar-
cerated group’s outcome in month t 5 260. Outcomes for this normalized not incarcer-
ated group are shown by the gray solid line. In both panels, the X-axis denotes months
since court decision (normalized to period 0).This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1285to diverge a little more than a year before the court decision, with the in-
carcerated group exceeding the nonincarcerated group by around 10%.
That is, the incarcerated defendants get intomore trouble with the police
in themonths leading up to their court decision. After the court decision,
the probability of being charged with a crime returns to around 10% for
both groups.16
In addition to describing our data, the graphs presented in figure 2
highlight the hazards of using OLS or difference-in-differences to esti-
mate the effects of incarceration. The incarcerated and nonincarcerated
groups are not comparable in their preincarceration levels. Moreover,
the trends in employment and criminal activity diverge before the court
decision in ways that indicate that there is an Ashenfelter dip prior to in-
carceration. These patterns motivate our quasi-experimental approach
using the random assignment of judges.17C. What Does It Mean to Be Incarcerated in Norway?To help with interpretation, we briefly describe prison conditions in Nor-
way (see http://kriminalomsorgen.no). Prisons emphasize rehabilita-
tion and follow the principle of normality set forth by the Directorate
of Norwegian Correctional Services. The principle dictates that “life in-
side will resemble life outside as much as possible” and that “offenders
shall be placed in the lowest possible security regime.” This means that
low-level offenders go directly to open prisons, which have minimal secu-
rity as well as more freedoms and responsibilities. Physically, these open
prisons resemble dormitories rather than rows of cells with bars. More se-
rious offenders who are at risk of violent or disruptive behaviors are sent
to closed prisons, which have heightened security. The two types of pris-
ons create a separation between minor and more hardened criminals, at
least until the hardened criminals have demonstrated good behavior.18
While more serious offenders serve the majority of their sentence in
closed prisons, they are usually transferred to open prisons for resociali-
zation and further rehabilitation before release. Overall, one-third of
prison beds are in open prisons, and the rest are in closed prisons.16 There are two reasons why both types of defendants can be charged with crimes in the
months immediately following a court decision. First, we measure when an individual was
charged, not when the crime was committed. Second, individuals can commit additional
crimes after their court decision before they have been imprisoned (5-month waiting time
on average) as well as additional crimes while in prison.
17 While one could omit the 12 months on either side of treatment in an attempt to
avoid the Ashenfelter dip, this would assume that the pretreatment changes are caused
by transitory shocks rather than a trend break (see the discussion in Ashenfelter and Card
1985).
18 This separation could be important, as Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen 2009 find that
inmates build criminal capital through interactions with other criminals.
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AllIn Norway, there are a total of 61 prisons. The largest prison (in Oslo)
has 392 cells, while the smallest has 13. Norway has a strict policy of one
prisoner per cell and tries to place prisoners close to home so that they
canmaintain links with the families. This means that there is often a wait-
ing list for nonviolent individuals before they can serve their prison time.
Sentenced individuals are released after their trial and receive a letter in-
forming them when a cell opens up; in our data, we calculate an average
wait time of 5 months.
To help with rehabilitation, all prisons offer education, mental health,
and training programs. In 2014, 38% and 33% of inmates in open and
closed prisons, respectively, participated in some type of educational or
training program. The most common programs are for high school and
work-related training, although inmates canalso takemiscellaneous courses.
All inmates are involved in some type of regular daily activity, unless they
have a serious mental or physical disability. If they are not enrolled in
an educational or training program, they must work within prison.19
All inmates have the right to daily physical exercise and access to a li-
brary and newspapers. By law, all prisoners have the same rights to health
care services as the rest of the population. The Norwegian Directorate of
Health is responsible for managing health programs for inmates. Most
notably, 18% of inmates participate in a drug-related program while in
prison. After release, there is an emphasis on helping offenders reinte-
grate into society, with access to programs set up to help ex-convicts find
a job and access social services, like housing support.20D. Comparison to Other CountriesThere are both similarities and differences in the criminal population
and the criminal justice system of Norway versus the rest of the world.
Alongmost dimensions,Norway looks broadly similar tomany otherWest-
ern European countries. Also, while it shares some commonalities with the
United States, theUnited States is an international outlier in some respects.1. Incarceration RatesFigure A1 graphs Norway’s incarceration rate over time. In 1980, there
were an estimated 44 incarcerated individuals per 100,000 inNorway. This
rate has increased gradually over time, with a rate of 72 per 100,000 in19 All prisoners, whether working or participating in training or education programs, re-
ceive a small stipend while in prison (around $8 per day in 2015). This stipend is not in-
cluded in any of our earnings measures.
20 It is important to realize that the initial judge assigned to a case does not determine
which prison a defendant is sent to; the type of training, educational, or work program a
defendant participates in; or when a defendant is eligible for parole.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 12872012. This 64% increase is not merely due to more crime being commit-
ted over time, as there has been a more modest 25% increase in crime
over the same period (Lappi-Seppälä 2012). Norway’s gradual increase
is mirrored in other Western European countries as well, although Nor-
way’s rate is slightly lower. In comparison, the US incarceration rate has
shot up dramatically, so much so that a separate scale is needed in the fig-
ure for the United States. Not only did the United States start at a higher
rate of 220 in 1980, but also this rate reached more than 700 by 2012.21
Comparing Norway and the United States with a broader set of coun-
tries, the United States remains an outlier. This can be seen in figure A2,
which plots incarceration rates versus gross domestic product (GDP) for
160 countries with a population of greater than half a million. No other
country comes close to the US rate of roughly 700 per 100,000, and only
the six countries of Rwanda, El Salvador, Turkmenistan, Thailand, Cuba,
and Russia have more than 400 per 100,000. In contrast, the figure shows
that Norway’s incarceration rate is similar to the average for other West-
ern European countries (102 per 100,000). The United States is particu-
larly an outlier after controlling for GDP per capita; relative to other
countries with high GDP per capita (purchasing power adjusted), the
US incarceration rate is several multiples higher.222. Inmate CharacteristicsAlong many dimensions, the prison populations in Norway, Western Eu-
rope, and theUnitedStates are similar.23 Across all these countries, roughly
three-fourths of inmates havenot completed the equivalent of high school.
Five percent of prisoners inNorway are female compared with 5% inWest-
ern Europe and 7% in the United States. In all these countries, inmates
are in their early or midthirties on average.
The types of offenses committed by inmates differ across countries but
perhaps less than one might expect. In terms of the fraction of prisoners
who have committed a drug offense, the rates are surprisingly similar, with
24% in Norway, 22% inWestern Europe, and 20% in the United States. By21 Neal and Rick (2016) show that most of the growth in incarceration rates in the United
States can be explained by changes in sentencing policy as opposed to higher crime and arrest
rates.
22 It is more difficult to compare measures of criminal activity across countries because
of differences in reporting. With this caveat in mind, the United States has more than dou-
ble the number of reported assaults than either Norway or the rest of Western Europe, ac-
cording to the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends (Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and
Malby 2010). Such differences cannot fully explain the large incarceration gap, however,
with at least part of the difference being due to longer mandatory sentencing policies
for minor crimes (see Raphael and Stoll 2013).
23 For details on the US criminal population, see Raphael and Stoll (2013) and Bureau of
Justice Statistics (2015). For Scandinavia and other European countries, see Kristoffersen
(2014) and Aebi, Tiago, and Burkhardt (2015).
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Allcomparison, 14% are serving a sentence for assault/battery and 4% for
rape/sexual assault in Norway, respectively, compared with 11% and 7%
inWestern Europe and 9% and 11% in the United States. Of course, these
comparisons need to be understood in the context of amuchhigher incar-
ceration rate in the United States. But they point to a considerable overlap
in the types of crimes committed by inmates across countries.243. Prison Expenditures, Sentence Lengths,
and Postrelease SupportOne difference across countries is the amount of money spent on pris-
oners. Western European countries spend an average of $66,000 per in-
mate per year, which is roughly double the average of $31,000 for the
United States. But these averages mask substantial heterogeneity in part
due to differences in labor costs, which in Norway account for two-thirds of
the prison budget. For example, in Norway the yearly total cost is $118,000
(similar to Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands), in Italy $61,000, and
in Portugal $19,000. In the United States, the state of New York spends
$60,000 per prisoner, Iowa $33,000, and Alabama $17,000. And in New
York City, the annual cost per inmate reaches $167,000.25
Norway is able tomaintain the type of prison conditions summarized in
section III.C in part due to its larger prison budget. In particular, more
resources can be devoted to education and training programs, and over-
crowding is not an issue. In contrast, while most state prison systems in
the United States aim to provide General Educational Development test
preparation, adult basic education, and vocational skills training, a re-
cent RAND (2014) report finds that funding for such initiatives is scarce.
The United States also faces serious overcrowding issues, with federal
prisons being 39%over capacity (GAO 2012) andmore than half of states
at or above their operational capacity (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014).
Another difference between Norway (and Western Europe) versus the
United States is sentence length. The average time spent in prison using
our judge stringency instrument is estimated to be 184 days, or 6months,
for our Norwegian sample. Almost 90% of spells are less than 1 year. This
is considerably shorter compared with the average prison time of 2.9 years24 These numbers for Norway differ from our estimation sample for two reasons: we do
not have illegal immigrants in our data set, and our sample is restricted to nonconfession
cases, which are randomly assigned. The numbers for the United States are the weighted
average of inmates in federal and state prisons.
25 Cost estimates are calculated by dividing total prison budgets by number of prisoners.
The numbers for Western Europe (sans Belgium and Switzerland) are for 2013 and are
purchasing power parity adjusted (Aebi, Tiago, and Burkhardt 2015). The data for
40 US states with available data are for 2010 (Henrichson and Delaney 2012). New York
City data are for 2012 (NYC Independent Budget Office 2013).
This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1289for the United States (Pew Center 2011) and fairly similar to the median
of 6.8 months in other Western European countries (Aebi, Tiago, and
Burkhardt 2015). Because of this disparity in sentence lengths, the aver-
age cost per prisoner spell in Norway and Europe is smaller compared
with the United States, even though the cost per prisoner per year is gen-
erally higher.
Norway has been a leader in reforming its penal system to help inte-
grate inmates back into society upon release. While offenders in Norway
may lose their job when going to prison, they are usually not asked or re-
quired to disclose their criminal record on most job applications. More-
over, while gaps will still appear on employment resumes, these will often
spanmonths rather than years due to shorter prison spells. Upon release,
all inmates have access to support from the Norwegian work and welfare
services. This includes work training programs and help searching for a
job as well as access to a variety of social support programs, such as unem-
ployment benefits, disability insurance, and social assistance.IV. Assessing the Instrument
A. Instrument RelevanceFigure 3 shows the identifying variation in our data, providing a graph-
ical representation of the first stage. In the background of this figure is a
histogram that shows the distribution of our instrument (controlling for
fully interacted year and court dummies). Our instrument is the average
judge incarceration rate in other cases a judge has handled, including
the judge’s past and future cases that may fall outside of our estimation
sample. The mean of the instrument is 0.45, with a standard deviation of
0.08. The histogram reveals a wide spread in a judge’s tendency to incar-
cerate. For example, a judge at the 90th percentile incarcerates about
54% of cases as compared with approximately 37% for a judge at the
10th percentile.
Figure 3 also plots the probability a defendant is sent to prison in the
current case as a function of whether he is assigned to a strict or lenient
judge. The graph is a flexible analog to the first stage in equation (2),
plotting estimates from a local linear regression. The likelihood of receiv-
ing a prison sentence is monotonically increasing in the judge stringency
instrument and is close to linear. Table 2 reports first-stage estimates
where we regress a dummy for whether a defendant is incarcerated in
the current case on our stringency instrument. In panel A, we include
fully interacted court and year dummies but otherwise no other controls.
The first column reports the first-stage estimate at the time of the court
decision, whereas the other columns report first-stage estimates in each
of the five subsequent years. These columns are identical except for theThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1290 journal of political economy
Allvery modest impact of sample attrition (around 6% over 5 years) stem-
ming from death or emigration of defendants.26 The point estimate of
nearly 0.5 barely moves across columns, indicating that attrition exerts
a negligible impact on the first-stage relationship. The estimates are highly
significant, suggesting that being assigned to a judge with a 10 percentage
point higher overall incarceration rate increases the probability of receiv-
ing a prison sentence by roughly 5 percentage points.27FIG. 3.—First-stage graph of incarceration on judge stringency. The baseline sample
consists of 33,548 nonconfession criminal cases processed in 2005–9. The probability of in-
carceration is plotted on the right Y-axis against leave-out mean judge stringency of the as-
signed judge, shown along the X-axis. The plotted values are mean-standardized residuals
from regressions on court  court entry year interacted fixed effects, and all variables are
listed in table 1. The solid line shows a local linear regression of incarceration on judge
stringency. Dashed lines show 90% confidence intervals. The histogram shows the density
of judge stringency along the left Y-axis (top and bottom 2% excluded).26 Another test for selective attrition is to regress the probability of attriting on the judge
stringency instrument. Performing this test, we find no evidence of a significant relation-
ship (see table B1).
27 Note that the number of instruments is determined by the number of moment con-
ditions (and not the number of values the instrument takes). Even though there are many
judges, our 2SLS model has one moment condition and therefore a single instrument.
Note also that the first-stage coefficient need not be 1, unless the following conditions
hold: (1) the sample of cases used to calculate the stringency measure is exactly the same
as the estimation sample, (2) there are no covariates, and (3) there are a large number of
cases per judge. In our setting, there is no reason to expect a coefficient of 1. In particular,
the full set of court times year dummies breaks this mechanical relationship. In sec. V, we
perform specification checks for the instrument, including a split-sample approach.
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AllB. Instrument Validity
1. Conditional IndependenceFor our instrument to be valid, the stringency of a judge must be uncor-
related with both defendant and case characteristics that could affect a
defendant’s future outcomes (controlling for fully interacted court and
year dummies). As discussed in section II.B, table 1 provides strong empir-
ical support for the claim that the criminal justice system in Norway ran-
domly assigns cases to judges within each court in a given time period.
As a second test, panels B and C of table 2 explore what happens if a
large set of control variables are added to the first-stage regressions. If
judges are randomly assigned, predetermined variables should not signif-
icantly change the estimates, as they should be uncorrelated with the in-
strument. As expected, the coefficient does not change appreciably when
demographic and crime type controls are added in panel B. As shown in
panel C, this coefficient stability continues to hold when we additionally
condition on lagged dependent variables capturing a defendant’s prior
work and criminal history.2. ExclusionConditional randomassignment of cases to judges is sufficient for a causal
interpretation of the reduced form (RF) impact of being assigned to a
stricter judge. However, interpreting the IV estimates as measuring the
causal effect of incarceration requires an exclusion restriction: the incar-
ceration rate of the judge should affect the defendant’s outcomes only
through the incarceration sentencing channel and not directly in any other
way. The key challenge here is that trial decisions are multidimensional,
with the judge deciding on incarceration, fines, community service, pro-
bation, and guilt. After discussing ourmain results, we will present empir-
ical evidence that the exclusion restriction holds (see sec. V.E). In partic-
ular, we will show that our estimates do not change appreciably when we
augment our baselinemodel to either control for judge stringency in other
dimensions or include an instrument for other trial sentencing decisions.3. MonotonicityIf the causal effect of incarceration is constant across defendants, then
the instrument needs to satisfy only the conditional independence and
exclusion assumptions. With heterogeneous effects, however, monoto-
nicity must also be assumed. In our setting, themonotonicity assumption
requires that defendants incarcerated by a lenient judge would also be in-
carcerated by a stricter judge, and vice versa for nonincarceration. ThisThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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terpretation; that is, it is an average causal effect among the subgroup of
defendants who could have received a different incarceration decision
had their case been assigned to a different judge.
One testable implication of the monotonicity assumption is that the
first-stage estimates should be nonnegative for any subsample. For this
test, we continue to construct the judge stringency variable using the full
sample of available cases but estimate the first stage on the specified sub-
sample. Results are reported in column 1 of table B2. In panel A, we con-
struct a composite index of all the characteristics found in table 1, namely,
predicted probability of incarceration, using the coefficients from anOLS
regression of the probability of incarceration on these variables (while
conditioning on fully interacted court and year dummies). We then esti-
mate separate first-stage estimates for the four quartiles of predicted in-
carceration. Panel B breaks the data into six crime types. Panels C and
D split the data by previous labor market attachment and by whether
the defendant has previously been incarcerated, respectively. Panels E–
G split the samples by age, education, and number of children. For all
these subsamples, the first-stage estimates are large, positive, and statisti-
cally different from zero, consistent with the monotonicity assumption.
A second implication of monotonicity is that judges should be stricter
for a specific case type (e.g., violent crimes) if they are stricter in other
case types (e.g., all crimes except for violent crimes). To test this implica-
tion, we break the data into the same subsamples as we did for the first test
but redefine the instrument for each subsample to be the judge’s incar-
ceration rate for cases outside of the subsample. For example, for the vi-
olent crime subsample, we use a judge’s incarceration rate constructed
from all cases except violent crime cases. Column 2 of table B2 lists the
first-stage estimates using this reverse-sample instrument, which excludes
own-type cases. The first-stage estimates are all positive and statistically
different from zero, suggesting that judges who are stricter for one type
of case are also stricter for other case types.V. Effects of Incarceration on RecidivismIn this section, we present our main findings, showing that (1) incarcer-
ation causes a large reduction in the probability of reoffending; (2) the
drop is not due to only incapacitation, with further reductions in criminal
charges after release; and (3) the total number of charged crimes falls
over time, withmany individuals being diverted from a future life of crime.
We then contrast these IV estimates to OLS, learning that the high rates
of recidivism among ex-convicts is due to selection and not a conse-
quence of the experience of being in prison. Several robustness and het-
erogeneity checks follow.This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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AllA. Main Results
1. Reoffense ProbabilitiesPanel A of figure 4 graphically presents IV estimates of the effect of incar-
ceration on the probability of reoffending. We define reoffending as the
probability of being charged with at least one crime by the end of a given
time period.
The graph presents a series of cumulative monthly estimates from
1month to 60months after the court decision. For example, the estimate
at month 6 uses the probability an individual has been charged with at
least one crime by 6 months after the decision as the dependent variable
in the second stage of the IV model. As expected, there is little effect on
reoffending in the first few months after the court decision, since not
much time has elapsed for the committing of new crimes. But the esti-
mate becomes more negative over time, and at around 18 months there
is a large and statistically significant reduction of over 25percentagepoints
in recidivism for those previously sentenced to incarceration. This nega-
tive effect persists at roughly the same level all the way to 60 months.2. Incapacitation versus Postrelease EffectsThe recidivism effect found in panel A of figure 4 could simply be due to
incapacitation, as individuals sentenced to prison time will be locked up
and therefore have few criminal opportunities.28 To better understand
the role of incapacitation, table 3 presents IV estimates of the effects of
incarceration on prison time.
We find that, on average, being incarcerated leads to a sentence of
231 days in prison. But this is sentencing time (i.e., potential prison time),
not actual time served. Using the IV model, we estimate that being incar-
cerated leads to 184 days, or approximately 6months, in actual prison time
served. This smaller number makes sense, as Norway allows individuals to
be released on parole after serving about two-thirds of their prison sen-
tence for good behavior.29 In column 2 of table 3, we also estimate the av-
erage wait time between the court decision and when individuals start serv-
ing their prison sentence. The average wait time is estimated to be around
5 months.
In panel B of figure 4, we plot a series of IVestimates for the probability
of being in prison, 1–60 months after the court decision. The figure is28 Individuals may be charged with a crime while serving prison time, as they can commit
crimes while in prison. They may also have other cases working their way through the sys-
tem while in prison.
29 The IV estimate suggests that a majority of individuals receive parole in our data set. If
an inmate commits a new offense while on parole, this counts as a new charge in our data
set.
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Allsimilar to a survival function, in that if all treated individuals (i.e., those
sentenced to prison) started out in prison in month 1, the estimates
wouldmap out 1minus the probability of exit fromprison. It is not exactly
a survival function though, since not all individuals sentenced to prison
begin serving their sentences immediately because of waiting times for
an open space. As expected, the probability of being in prison if an indi-
vidual is sentenced to prison starts out high. This probability falls rapidly,
with fewer than 30% of incarcerated individuals being in prison for the
original criminal charge 6 months after the court decision. By month 18,
only around 5% of these individuals are still in prison, and by month 24
almost none are still in prison.
The main point to take away from panel B of figure 4 is that any inca-
pacitation effect from being incarcerated at time 0 can operate in only
the first 2 years. Using this insight, we now graph the probability of ever
being charged with a crime between months 25 and 60 in panel C of fig-
ure 4. By ignoring crimes committed within the first 2 years after the de-
cision, we are estimating incarceration effects that cannot be attributed
to the original incapacitation spell. As in panel A of figure 4, it takes a few
months for individuals to start being charged with a crime in this window.
But by 15 months after the start of this new window (i.e., 39 months after
the court decision), there is a strong and statistically significant reduction
in crimes for individuals previously sentenced to prison. The effect is a siz-
able 25 percentage point reduction in reoffending at least once between
months 25 and 60.
In table B3, we provide further granularity by running year-by-year
models for crimes committed in a particular year. The table documentsTABLE 3















RF: judge stringency 104.57** 67.89*** 83.19***
(49.03) (19.47) (25.15)
2SLS: incarcerated 231.088** 150.02*** 183.83***
(91.72) (38.12) (49.78)
Dependent mean 153.75 69.92 69.20This conte
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nd Conditions (http://wNote.—Shown is the baseline sample of nonconfession criminal cases processed in
2005–9. Controls include all variables listed in table 1. Days spent in pretrial custody are
included in actual prison time in col. 3. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the judge
and defendant level.
** p < :05.
*** p < :01., 2020 02:40:28 AM
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1297a negative recidivism effect in the first year (whenmost individuals are in
prison for the current case), the second year (after the majority are al-
ready released from prison), and in each of years 3–5 (when virtually
all are out of prison). The individual point estimates are somewhat noisy,
but the estimates all go in the samedirection. In table 4, we group the first
2 years together and years 3–5 together for increased precision. That ta-
ble reveals sizable reductions in recidivism both in years 1 and 2 as well as
in years 3–5, consistent with a reduction in crime that is separate from an
incapacitation effect.
In theory, it is possible that future pretrial detentions or prison spells
could induce an incapacitation effect even after the original prison spell
is completed. This could happen if a prior prison sentence flags an indi-
vidual as higher risk so that in a future case they are either remanded toTABLE 4


















No controls .130*** .115*** .113*** 5.275***
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.321)
Demographics and
type of crime .126*** .109*** .105*** 5.369***
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.310)
All controls .068*** .050*** .052*** 2.917***
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.278)
Complier
reweighted .057*** .042*** .049*** 1.595***
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.251)
RF: judge stringency:
All controls 2.108** 2.111** 2.133*** 25.196**
(.047) (.048) (.045) (2.452)
IV: incarcerated:
All controls 2.239** 2.245** 2.293*** 211.482**
(.113) (.113) (.106) (5.705)
Dependent mean .57 .57 .70 10.21
Complier mean if
not incarcerated .56 .57 .73 13.62This conte
All use subject to Universnt downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27
ity of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://wNote.—Shown is the baseline sample of nonconfession criminal cases processed in
2005–9. Controls include all variables listed in table 1. In addition, RF and IV also control
for court  court entry year fixed effects. OLS standard errors are clustered at the defen-
dant level, while RF and IV standard errors are two-way clustered at the judge and defen-
dant level.
** p < :05.
*** p < :01., 2020 02:40:28 AM
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Allcustody while awaiting trial or have an increased chance of being sent to
prison. To explore this possibility, in table B4 we examine whether judge
stringency in the current case affects time spent in prison for new charges
unrelated to the current case. We first estimate how an incarceration sen-
tence in the current case affects the probability of being sent to prison in
the future as a result of either pretrial detention or a new incarceration
sentence. We find only a small insignificant effect (a 1 percentage point
increase relative to the mean of 42%). This small impact likely reflects
two opposing forces. Incarceration reduces the likelihood of recidivism,
thus lowering the chances of being charged with a future crime. At the
same time, we find evidence suggesting that the probability of being in-
carcerated in the future conditional on an individual being charged with
a future crime is higher, consistent with the notion that judges are tougher
on repeat offenders (see table B4).
The small effect on future incarceration helps interpret the mecha-
nisms behind ourmain estimates. In particular, they suggest that incapac-
itation effects due to future prison spells do not explain the large and
persistent reduction in recidivism. For example, estimates for the cumu-
lative number of days spent in prison for new cases is just 4.5 days. This
increase is small compared with the direct increase of 184 days of prison
time served reported in table 3.3. Number of CrimesA comparison of panels A and C in figure 4 suggests that incarceration
not only prevents an individual from ever committing a crime (the exten-
sive margin) but also prevents individuals from committing a series of
future crimes (the intensivemargin). In panel A, aftermonth 18, the prob-
ability of ever being charged with a crime is flat, suggesting that additional
individuals are not being prevented from committing a crime after that
time. But in panel C, we see that the probability an individual will commit
a crime between 25 and 60 months is affected by an incarceration deci-
sion at time 0. Thismeans thatmany of the individuals whowere prevented
from committing a crime in panel A are also being prevented from com-
mitting another crime in panel C.
To further explore the intensive margin, panel A of figure 5 plots IV
estimates for the cumulative number of charges in the months after the
court decision. The estimated effects become more negative over time.
After 1 year, the estimated effect of an incarceration decision is around
three fewer crimes per individual, whereas after 2 years, the effect is seven
fewer crimes. By 4 years, the effect is 11 fewer crimes per individual (see
also table 4).This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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All4. Potential CrimesOur IV estimates represent the average causal effects for compliers who
could have received a different court decision had their case been as-
signed to a different judge. To better understand this LATE, we follow
Imbens and Rubin (1997) and Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad (2014) in de-
composing the IV estimates into the average potential outcomes if the
compliers would have been incarcerated and if they would not have been
incarcerated. The top line in panel B of figure 5 is the number of poten-
tial charges if the compliers would not have been incarcerated. The line
trends upward in close to a linear fashion, with approximately two to
three extra criminal charges per year and around 13 crimes on average
after 5 years. In sharp contrast, the compliers would have been charged
with far fewer crimes if incarcerated; even by month 60, they would have
been charged with only two crimes on average.
Panel C plots the distribution functions for cumulative potential charges
as of year 5 and for compliers if they would have been incarcerated and if
they would not have been incarcerated. The difference between the two
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) when the number of charges is
one is around 30 percentage points, which mirrors the IV effect graphed
in panel A of figure 4 at 5 years out. Comparing the CDFs further to the
right (i.e., for a larger number of charges) makes clear that incarceration
is not simply preventing low-crime individuals from committing future
crime. To see this, suppose that incarceration caused individuals who
would have been charged with five crimes or fewer (or some similarly
small number of crimes) from being charged with any crimes but that
more hardened criminals (those charged with more than five crimes)
were unaffected. In this case, the two lines in panel C would lie on top of
each other starting at five charges. But, in fact, the two lines diverge at
one charge, remain fairly parallel until around 18 charges, and do not
get close to each other until around 45 charges. For instance, 12%of com-
pliers would have been charged withmore than 18 crimes if they were not
incarcerated, whereas few, if any, compliers would have been charged
with this many crimes if incarcerated. Taken together, the results sug-
gest that incarceration must be preventing some individuals from being
charged with a large number of crimes and stopping some individuals
from a life of crime entirely.3030 From the graph, one cannot infer whether an individual charged with 35 crimes re-
duces their charges to zero vs. whether an individual charged with 35 crimes reduces their
crime to 15 while the individual charged with 15 reduces their crime to zero. But the
shapes of the CDFs do imply that high-volume criminals must reduce their number of
charged crimes.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1301B. Comparison to OLSWith few exceptions, the bulk of the research on recidivism is based on
OLS regressions with controls for observable confounding factors. In ta-
ble 4, we present OLS estimates of equation (1) with and without a rich
set of controls. The first OLS specification in table 4 regresses whether an
individual has reoffended (i.e., been charged with a new crime after the
court decision) on whether the defendant was sentenced to prison but
includes no other control variables. The OLS estimates 0–2 years after
the decision, 2–5 years after the decision, and 0–5 years after the decision
are all positive and significant; for example, individuals sent to prison are
11 percentage points more likely to reoffend at least once over the next
5 years.
In the next specification of table 4, we add a host of defendant charac-
teristics, including demographic variables and the type of crime they are
being charged with. These controls affect the estimates only slightly. In
the third specification, we additionally add lagged variables for whether
defendants have previously been chargedwith a crime, whether they have
previously been incarcerated for a previous crime, and whether they have
worked in the prior year (i.e., including all the variables listed in table 2 as
controls). This brings the coefficient down to 5 percentage points.
The divergence between the OLS estimates and the IV estimates in ta-
ble 4 is stark. The OLS estimates always remain positive, while the IV es-
timates are negative and large. One possible explanation is that the OLS
estimates suffer from selection bias due to correlated unobservables. If
this is the case, we can conclude that the high rates of recidivism among
ex-convicts is due to selection and not a consequence of the experience
of being in prison.
Another possible explanation for the differences between the IV and
OLS estimates is effect heterogeneity, so that the average causal effects
for the compliers differ in sign compared with the mean impacts for
the entire population. To explore this possibility, it is useful to character-
ize compliers by their observable characteristics. We begin by splitting
our sample into eight mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sub-
groups based on prior labor market attachment and the predicted prob-
ability of incarceration (see table B5). The predicted probability of incar-
ceration is a composite index of all the observable characteristics, while
prior employment is the key source of heterogeneity in effects, as dis-
cussed in the next section. Next, we estimate the first-stage equation (2)
separately for each subsample, allowing us to calculate the proportion
of compliers by subgroup. We then reweight the estimation sample so
that the proportion of compliers in a given subgroup matches the share
of the estimation sample for that subgroup. The fourth row of table 4 pre-
sents OLS estimates based on this reweighted sample. The results suggestThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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Allthat the differences between the IV and the OLS estimates cannot be ac-
counted for by heterogeneity in effects, at least due to observables.C. Specification ChecksBefore exploring the results further, we present specification checks re-
lated to the construction of the instrument and the procedure for infer-
ence (see also app. D). The first column of table B6 presents our baseline
results for comparison. In this specification, we include any defendant
whose judge handled at least 50 cases. In the next three specifications,
we instead require judges to handle at least 25 cases, at least 75 cases,
or at least 100 cases, respectively. These changes do not materially affect
the estimated effects. This is reassuring, as one might be worried that the
statistical inference becomes unreliable if the number of cases per judge
is too small.
The next two specification checks examine sensitivity to changing how
the instrument is constructed. In column 5, we randomly split our sample
in half and use one half of the sample to calculate the average incarcer-
ation rate of each judge. We next use these measures of judge leniency
as an instrument for incarceration in the other half of the sample. The
resulting estimates (and standard errors) do not materially change. The
last column shows that our findings are not sensitive to whether we calcu-
late judge stringency based on nonconfession cases only or if we include
all randomly assigned cases (both confession andnonconfession cases) in
these calculations.
As a final robustness check, panel D in table B6 reports Anderson-
Rubin (AR) confidence intervals. The confidence intervals remain valid
whether or not the instrument is weak, in the sense that their probability
of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis and covering the true param-
eter value remains well controlled. Since IV estimates are nonnormally
distributed when an instrument is weak, the AR procedure does not rely
on point estimates and standard errors but instead uses test inversion.31
We find that the confidence intervals do not materially change. Consis-
tent with this finding, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of weak
instrument using the test proposed byMontiel Olea and Pflueger (2013).D. Heterogeneous Effects
1. First-Time OffendersWe now examine whether there are heterogeneous effects in the recidi-
vism result. We first limit the sample to first-time offenders, defined as31 For details on the procedure, see the review article by Andrews, Stock, and Sun (2019).
This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1303defendants who have not previously served time in prison and for whom
this is the first court case observed in our sample. Table C2 reports results
analogous to table 4 for this subsample. The 5-year cumulative estimates
in column 3 are somewhat larger for first-time offenders, with the prob-
ability of recidivism dropping by 43 percentage points. Interestingly, the
effect is concentrated in themonths 25–60 after their court decision, with
less evidence for a drop in crime during the period that includes their im-
prisonment (months 1–24).
Looking at first-time offenders is useful not only for exploring hetero-
geneous effects but also for ease of interpretation. In our baseline sam-
ple, individuals can appear more than once in our data set if they are
brought to trial formultiple crimes over time. Individuals appearingmul-
tiple times could be in the incarcerated group in one year and the non-
incarcerated group in another year. While judges are randomly assigned
for each case and hence the baseline estimate is still causal, the interpre-
tation is more nuanced. With first-time offenders, each individual ap-
pears only once in the sample. The cost of looking only at an individual’s
first criminal case is that the sample drops in half, frommore than 30,000
observations to fewer than 15,000. Given that the results are qualitatively
similar but with less precision for the smaller sample, we focus on results
using themore comprehensive data set, which contains all cases with ran-
dom assignment. A more complete set of results for first-time offenders,
which mirror those found for the full sample in what follows, can be found
in tables C1–C3.2. Open versus Closed PrisonsA second type of heterogeneity is the type of prison an individual is sent
to. As a reminder, there are two types of prisons in Norway: open and
closed. As described in section III.C, open prisons have minimal security
as well as more freedoms and responsibilities compared with closed pris-
ons. The two types of prisons not only result in different day-to-day activi-
ties but also create a separation between minor and more hardened crim-
inals. Whether a convicted defendant is initially sent to an open or closed
prison depends on both the severity of the crime as well as geographical
proximity and available space at open versus closed prisons. Judges do
not directly determine whether individuals are sent to open versus closed
prisons. Moreover, when we run a multinomial regression with three out-
comes (incarcerated in open prison, incarcerated in closed prison, not in-
carcerated), we find that a judge’s stringency does not differentially affect
whether an individual is sent to an open versus a closed prison.3232 In a multinomial logit regression, which includes the same controls as in panel C of
table 2, judge stringency has an average marginal effect of 0.24 (standard error is 0.04) for
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AllTo explore whether the types of individuals sent to open versus closed
prisons experience different outcomes, we first predict whether an indi-
vidual will be sent to an open versus closed prison on the basis of the pre-
determined characteristics in table 2. We then create dummy variables
for whether an individual’s probability of being sent to an open prison
is above or below the median. Finally, we interact these dummy variables
with our judge stringencymeasure and create two analogous instruments.
In table B7, we reestimate ourmain IV specification but with two separate
endogenous variables and instruments based on the interactions.We find
remarkably similar effects of incarceration on recidivism for those individ-
uals with below and above median probabilities of being sent to an open
versus a closed prison (see col. 4). However, it is important not to over-
interpret these results, since the two groups could experience heteroge-
neous effects from incarceration if prison type were held fixed.3. Marginal Treatment EffectsFinally, we explore heterogeneity by examining MTEs. Ignoring sub-
scripts for simplicity, we model the observed outcome as Y 5 I  Y ð1Þ1
ð1 2 I Þ  Y ð0Þ, where I is an indicator for treatment (being incarcerated)
and Y(1) and Y(0) are the associated potential outcomes, which are a lin-
ear function of both observable (X ) and unobservable factors. The choice
of treatment by a judge is given by I 5 1½uðX , ZÞ 2 U , where u is an un-
known function, U is an unobserved continuous random variable, and Z
is our judge stringency instrument.33 One can normalize the distribution
ofU jX 5 x to be uniformly distributed over ½0, 1 for every value ofX. Un-
der this normalization, it is straightforward to show that uðX , Z Þ is equal to
the propensity score pðX , ZÞ ; P ½D 5 1jX 5 x, Z 5 z.
The MTE is defined as E ½Y ð1Þ 2 Y ð0ÞjU 5 u, X 5 x. The depen-
dence of the MTE on U for a fixed X reflects unobserved heterogeneity
in treatment effects, as indexed by a judge’s latent propensity to choose
incarceration for a defendant (whereU captures unobserved characteris-
tics of the defendant, which influence the judge’s choice). The choice
equation implies that, given X, defendants with lower values of U are
more likely to take treatment, regardless of their realization of Z. Follow-
ing Brinch,Mogstad, andWiswall (2017), we assume separability between
observed andunobservedheterogeneity in the treatment effects. Together
with the assumption of an exogenous instrument that satisfies monotonic-
ity, this restriction on the potential outcomes is sufficient to allow point
identification of MTE over the unconditional support of the propensity33 The weakly separable choice equation is equivalent to assuming monotonicity
(Imbens and Angrist 1994).
open prison versus 0.22 (standard error is 0.04) for closed prison, with not incarcerated
being the omitted category.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1305score pðX , ZÞ.34 We probe the stability of MTE estimates to various specifi-
cations of the empirical MTEmodel. Reassuringly, the estimates based on
a linear, quadratic, cubic, or quartic specification all yield similar estimates,
as does a semiparametric specification based on local linear regressions.
Panel A in figure 6 graphs the propensity score distributions for the
treated and untreated samples. The dashed lines indicate the upper
and the lower points of the propensity score with common support (after
trimming 1%of the sample with overlap in the distributions of propensity
scores). Panel B of figure 6 plots MTE estimates by the unobserved resis-
tance to treatment (i.e., the latent variable U ) based on a local IV ap-
proach using a global cubic polynomial specification. TheMTE estimates
aremost negative for those with a low unobserved resistance to treatment
and rise as unobserved resistance to treatment increases. This implies
that incarceration reduces recidivism the most for defendants whose
unobservables would make them very likely to go to prison regardless
of the stringency of their judge. In contrast, defendants whose unobserv-
ables would make them very unlikely to go to prison experience, if any-
thing, an increase in recidivism due to treatment, with the caveat that
the estimates are noisy.
As shown byHeckman andVytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007), all conventional
treatment parameters can be expressed as different weighted averages of
the MTE. Recovering these treatment parameters for the entire popula-
tion, however, requires full support of the propensity score pðX , ZÞ on the
unit interval. Since we do not have full support, we followCarneiro,Heck-
man, and Vytlacil (2011) in rescaling the weights so that they integrate to
1 over the region of common support. Table B8 uses theMTEestimates to
construct such rescaled estimates of the ATT, ATE, and ATUT. These
weighted averages are obtained by integrating the MTE over the propen-
sity score for the relevant sample. The ATTestimates reveal that the recid-
ivism effects of imprisonment are especially large for the treated; for ex-
ample, the linear specification yields an estimate of20.42, which is more
negative than either the LATE or the ATE. By comparison, the estimated
ATE (also plotted as the horizontal line in fig. 6) is similar to the LATE.
The ATUT, in contrast, is closer to zero and not statistically significant.E. Threats to Exclusion RestrictionAs discussed in section IV.B, interpreting the IVestimates as average causal
effects of incarceration requires the judge stringency instrument to affect34 Separability between observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect
is weaker than additive separability between I and X, which is a standard auxiliary assump-
tion in applied work using IV. Furthermore, it is implied by (but does not imply) full inde-
pendence ðZ , X ? Y ð1Þ, Y ð0Þ,U Þ, a common assumption in applied work estimatingMTEs.
See Mogstad and Torgovitsky (2018).
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AllFIG. 6.—Common support and MTEs. Shown is the baseline sample of nonconfession
criminal cases processed in 2005–9 (N 5 31,428 in month 60 after decision). In A, dashed
lines indicate the upper and the lower points of the propensity score with common support
(based on 1% trimming). In B, the MTE estimates are based on a local IV approach using a
global cubic polynomial specification for the trimmed sample with common support (N 5
28,275). Standard errors are constructed on the basis of 100 bootstrap replications. A color
version of this figure is available online.This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1307the defendant’s outcomes only through the prison sentencing channel.
A potential issue is that trial decisions are multidimensional, with judges
deciding on incarceration, fines, community service, probation, and guilt
(where the penalties are not mutually exclusive).
To make this issue precise, it is useful to extend the baseline IV model
given by equations (1) and (2), distinguishing between the incarceration
decision and other trial decisions:
I Incari,0 5 aZ
Incar
j ið Þ 1 gZ
Other
j ið Þ 1 X
0
id 1 vi,0, (3)
I Otheri,0 5 zZ
Incar
j ið Þ 1 lZ
Other
j ið Þ 1 X
0
iw 1 ui,0, (4)
Yi,t 5 bt I
Other




i qt 1 hi,t , (5)
where j denotes the judge that handles defendant i‘s case; I Incari,0 is an in-
dicator variable equal to 1 if defendant i is sentenced to prison in period
0; I Otheri,0 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant i is sentenced to
fines, community service, or probation; ZIncarjðiÞ denotes the judge stringency
instrument for the incarceration decision; ZOtherjðiÞ denotes the judge strin-
gency instrument for trial decisions other than incarceration; and Xi is
a vector of control variables that includes a full set of case year  court
dummy variables. The omitted reference category is not guilty. As in the
baseline model, we measure ZIncarjðiÞ and Z
Other
jðiÞ as leave-out means.
There are two cases in which the baseline IV estimates based on equa-
tions (1) and (2) are biased because they abstract from trial decisions
other than incarceration. The first case is if Z IncarjðiÞ correlates with Z
Other
jðiÞ ,
and ZOtherjðiÞ directly affects Yi,t (conditional onXi). This would violate the ex-
clusion restriction in the baseline IV model because ZIncarjðiÞ affects Yi,t not
only through I Incari,0 but also through its correlation with Z
Other
jðiÞ . However,
controlling for ZOtherjðiÞ in both equations (1) and (2) will eliminate this
source of bias. The second case is if ZIncarjðiÞ correlates with I
Other
i,0 conditional
on ZOtherjðiÞ , and I
Other
i,0 affects Yi,t holding I
Incar
i,0 fixed (conditional on Xi). In the
baseline IV model, this would violate the exclusion restriction because
ZIncarjðiÞ affects Yi,t not only through I
Incar
i,0 but also through its influence on
I Otheri,0 . The augmented IV model given by equations (3)–(5) addresses this




In tables B9 and B10, we examine these two cases, finding support for
the exclusion restriction. To start, we first calculate a judge’s tendencies35 Note that a causal interpretation of the IV estimates based on eqq. (3)–(5) requires
assumptions in addition to the instrument exogeneity and monotonicity conditions dis-
cussed in sec. IV.B. As shown by Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016), one may either
assume that the effects of each treatment are the same across individuals or invoke addi-
tional restrictions on individuals’ choice behavior.
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Allon trial decisions other than incarceration.36 For example, we measure a
judge’s probation stringency as the average probation rate in the other
cases a judge has handled. Panel A of table B9 repeats our baseline spec-
ification for comparison. In panel B, we add a judge’s probation stringency,
community service stringency, and fine stringency as three additional
controls in both the first and the second stages. A decision of not guilty
is the omitted category. The IV estimates for both recidivism outcomes
are similar to our baseline, albeit with standard errors that are larger. To
increase precision, panel C combines these three control variables into a
single “probation, community service, or fine” stringency variable. Again,
the IV estimates for recidivism are similar to the baseline in panel A, but
the standard errors are considerably larger.
We next estimate the augmented IVmodel given by equations (3)–(5).
Table B10 presents the first stage, RF, and IV estimates. To make sure we
have enough precision and avoid problems associated with weak instru-
ments, we use a specification with three decision margins: “incarcera-
tion,” “probation, community service, or fine,” and “not guilty.” For the
incarceration first stage, the judge stringency instrument for the incarcer-
ation decision has a similar coefficient as before. For the other first stage,
the judge stringency instrument for the incarceration decision matters lit-
tle, if anything, but the other instrument is strongly significant. To formally
evaluate the overall strength of the instruments, we report the Sanderson-
Windmeijer F-statistics, indicating that weak instruments are not an issue.
Looking at the RF estimates, the coefficients on the judge stringency in-
strument for the incarceration decision are virtually unchanged compared
with the baseline IV model. In contrast, we find that the judge stringency
instrument for the otherdecisionshas almost noeffect on recidivism in the
RF. Likewise, the IV estimates for incarceration in the final columns of ta-
ble B10 are similar to those from the baseline IV model, which does not
include an instrument for the other decision margins.
A useful by-product of examining the threats to exclusion from trial
decisions other than incarceration is that it helps with interpretation.
The baseline IV model compares the potential outcomes if incarcerated
with the outcomes that would have been realized if not incarcerated.
The augmented IV model helps to clarify what is meant by not incarcer-
ated, distinguishing between not guilty as opposed to alternative sen-
tences to imprisonment. The IV estimates in table B10 suggest signifi-
cant effects of being sentenced to prison compared with being found
not guilty, whereas the “probation, community service, or fine” category
does not have a statistically different effect compared with not guilty.36 While not a trial decision per se, judges could also differ in how quickly they process
cases. Creating a second instrument on the basis of a judge’s average processing time in
other cases they have handled and redoing the empirical tests reported below with process-
ing time as an additional covariate yields similar conclusions.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1309F. Sentence LengthIt is possible that strict judges (as measured by our judge stringency in-
strument) are more likely both to incarcerate defendants and to give
them longer sentences. If this is the case, our baseline estimates capture
a linear combination of the extensivemargin effect of being incarcerated
and the intensive margin of longer sentences. However, most of the sen-
tences observed in the data are short, so there is limited variation along
the intensive dimension. As shown in figure B2, the median sentence
length is 3 months in our sample, with roughly 80% of sentences being
less than 1 year. Empirically, there is little difference in sentence lengths
across judges, holding incarceration rates fixed. This is consistent with
judges having discretion on the incarceration decision but using manda-
tory rules or guidelines for sentence lengths.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we now explore various models that
use sentence length. To provide context, panel a of figure B3 graphs sen-
tence length in days (including zeros) as a function of our judge incar-
ceration stringency instrument. The upward slope largely reflects the fact
that stricter judges send more defendants to prison. Panel b illustrates
how sentence length is affected by our instrument. It plots estimates of
the probability a sentence length will exceed a given number of days (in-
cluding zeros) as a function of the judge stringency instrument and re-
veals that most of the action is for relatively short sentences.37 As shown
in table 3, using our judge stringency instrument results in an increase
of roughly 6 months spent in prison, which helps in interpreting our
main estimates in table 4.
A complementary analysis is to replace the endogenous variable of in-
carceration with sentence length but still use our judge incarceration
stringency variable as the instrument. As shown by Imbens and Angrist
(1994), 2SLS applied to an IV model with variable treatment intensity
(such as days in prison) captures a weighted average of causal responses
to a unit change in treatment for those whose treatment status is affected
by the instrument. The weight attached to the jth unit of treatment is pro-
portional to thenumber of peoplewho, because of the instrument, change
their treatment from less than j to j or more. In our setting, this means
that coding the endogenous regressor as days in prison (instead of incar-
ceration) permits identification of a weighted average of the effect of an-
other day in prison. Thus, this parameter captures a convex combination
of the extensivemargin effect of going to prison and the intensivemargin
effects of longer sentencing. When estimating this model with days in
prison as the endogenous regressor, the results are consistent with those37 To calculate these estimates, we use a specification similar to eq. (2) but replace the
dependent variable for incarceration with indicators for a sentence length exceeding a
given number of days.
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Allusing the binary incarceration measure. The effect of increasing sen-
tence length by 250 days (roughly the average sentence length) yields es-
timates that are similar in size to our estimates based on the binary endog-
enous variable of incarceration but with standard errors that are 75%
larger (see table B11).
Finally, we consider models that include both incarceration and sen-
tence length simultaneously. Our first exploration is what happens if
we control for a judge’s sentence length stringency, defined as the aver-
age sentence length in the other cases a judge has handled. In panel D in
table B9, when we add in controls for sentence length stringency, it has
little effect on our IV estimates. When we try to go a step further, treating
both incarceration and sentence length as endogenous variables and us-
ing two instruments, the standard errors for IV blow up due to the multi-
colinearity of incarceration stringency and sentence length stringency
(see table B12).38 This means that we cannot separately identify the in-
tensive and extensive margin effects. But it is worth noting that the RF
regression, which includes both instruments, finds a similar estimate for
incarceration stringency compared with baseline and no significant ef-
fect for sentence length stringency.VI. Employment and RecidivismThis section explores factors that may explain the preventive effect of in-
carceration, showing that the decline in crime is driven by individuals
who were not working prior to incarceration. Among these individuals,
imprisonment increases participation in programs directed at improv-
ing employability and reducing recidivism and ultimately raises employ-
ment and earnings while discouraging further criminal behavior.A. Recidivism as a Function of Prior EmploymentTo examine heterogeneity in effects by labor market attachment, we assign
defendants to two similarly sized groups on the basis of whether they were
employed before the crime for which they are in court occurred.We classify
people as previously employed if they were working in at least one of the
past 5 years; the other individuals are defined as previously nonemployed.39
We then reestimate the IV model separately for each subgroup.38 These patterns are similar whether we also add controls for “probation, community
service, or fine” stringency. The first-stage graph of sentence length stringency on sentence
length can be found in panel c of fig. B3.
39 As in the study of Kostøl and Mogstad (2014), an individual is defined as employed in
a given year if his annual earnings exceed the yearly substantial gainful activity threshold
(used todetermine eligibility to government programs, such as unemployment insurance). In
2010, this amount was approximately NOK 72,900 ($12,500). Our results are not sensitive to
exactly how we define employment.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1311Figure 7 presents the IV estimates for the two subsamples of the effect
of incarceration on the probability of reoffending. The results show that
the effect is concentrated among the previously nonemployed. The ef-
fects of incarceration for this group are large and economically impor-
tant. In particular, the likelihood of reoffending within 5 years is cut
in half because of incarceration, from 96% to 50%. Examining the results
in figure B5 reveals that incarceration not only reduces the probability of
reoffending among the previously nonemployed but also the number of
crimes they commit. Five years out, this group is estimated to commit 22
fewer crimes per individual if incarcerated. By comparison, previously em-
ployed individuals experience no significant change in recidivism due to
incarceration.
A natural question is whether the heterogeneous effects are due to la-
bormarket attachment per se or to variables correlatedwithprior employ-
ment. To explore this, we first compare the characteristics of the previously
employed and nonemployed subsamples. As seen in table A2, the twoFIG. 7.—Effect of incarceration on recidivism by previous labor market attachment.
Shown is the baseline sample consisting of nonconfession criminal cases processed in
2005–9 (N 5 33,548 at time of decision and N 5 31,428 in month 60 after decision).
Dashed lines show 90% confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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Allsubsamples differ in characteristics other than prior employment.40 The
nonemployed group is about 2 years younger, less likely to be married,
and have lower education. They are more likely to commit property and
drug-related crimes instead of economic and traffic-related offenses, in-
cluding drunk driving. Both groups are charged with an equal number
of violent crimes. The nonemployed individuals are also 50% more likely
to have been charged with a crime in the year before their court case.
These comparisons make clear that the previously employed and non-
employed have different characteristics. To find out whether these differ-
ences can explain the contrasting recidivism effects, we reweight the sub-
samples so that they are similar on the basis of observables. To do this, we
estimate the probability of being in the previously employed group using
all the control variables listed in table 1 (excluding the variables on past
work history). Figure B4 plots the estimated propensity scores for both
the previously employed and the previously nonemployed groups. There
is substantial overlap for the entire range of employment probabilities.
Using these propensity scores, we weight each subsample so that they have
the same distribution as the opposite subsample.
Table 5 reports estimates in columns 1 and 3 for the baseline balanced
sample 5 years after the court decision, without any reweighting. Consis-
tent with the figures discussed above, prison time dramatically reduces
the extensive and intensive recidivism margins for the previously nonem-
ployeddefendants. The same is not true for thepreviously employed, where
the effects are much smaller in absolute value and not statistically signif-
icant. The table then reports the weighted results in columns 2 and 4. This
has little effect on the estimates, indicating that differences in observable
characteristics are not driving the contrasting results. Instead, it appears
that the differential effects are driven by labor market attachment per se
or correlated unobservable characteristics.B. The Effect of Incarceration on Future EmploymentWhy are the reductions in recidivism concentrated among the group of
defendants with no prior employment? To shed light on this question,
we turn to an examination of the labor market consequences of incarcer-
ation depending on prior employment.
Using the previously nonemployed sample, panel B of figure 8 plots
the IV estimates for the probability of being ever employed by a given
time period. Two years after the court decision, previously nonemployed40 A few of the nonemployed will have earned more than the minimum threshold in the
year before their court case, even though by definition the 5 years before their crime they
were nonemployed. This is because the date of a court case does not line up precisely with
the date of a crime.
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1313defendants experience a 30 percentage point increase in employment if
incarcerated. This employment boost grows further to a nearly 40 per-
centage point increase within 5 years. Panel b of figure B7 decomposes
the IV estimates into the potential employment rates of the compliers.
This decomposition reveals that only 12%of the previously nonemployed
compliers would have been employed if not incarcerated. By compari-
son, these compliers would experience a steady increase in employment
if incarcerated, with more than 50% being employed by month 60. In
panel A of figure 8, a different story emerges for the previously employed.
They experience an immediate 25 percentage point drop in employment
due to incarceration, and this effect continues out to 5 years.
We complement the employment results by examining the effects of
incarceration on cumulative hours of work and earnings. Starting with
the previously nonemployed defendants, in panel D of figure 8 we see
a steady increase in the number of hours worked due to incarceration.
The IV estimate increases modestly for the first 2 years and then startsTABLE 5






(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent Variable: Pr(Ever Charged)
Months 1–60 after decision Baseline Reweighted Baseline Reweighted
RF: judge stringency, all controls 2.062 2.079 2.183*** 2.157***
(.063) (.068) (.060) (.069)
IV: incarcerated, all controls 2.117 2.146 2.433** 2.365*
(.119) (.126) (.177) (.192)
Dependent mean .62 .58 .79 .76
Complier mean if not incarcerated .55 .60 .96 .86
B. Dependent Variable: Number of Charges
Months 1–60 after decision Baseline Reweighted Baseline Reweighted
RF: judge stringency, all controls 22.686 22.304 27.637** 28.448***
(3.134) (2.953) (3.167) (3.046)
IV: incarcerated, all controls 25.042 24.280 218.085** 219.688**
(5.983) (5.584) (8.452) (8.672)
Dependent mean 7.29 6.10 13.45 11.92
Complier mean if not incarcerated 3.61 5.16 24.01 21.97This content downloaded
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Allto increase at a faster rate. By month 60, incarceration increases labor
supply by 2,700 hours per individual, translating into more than 550 ad-
ditional hours per year on average. The decomposition by potential out-
comes in panels d and f of figure B7 helps explain what is happening. If
not incarcerated, few of the previously nonemployed compliers would
have gotten a job. As a result of incarceration, they get a job and continue
to accumulate hours over time.FIG. 8.—Effect of incarceration on employment by previous labor market attachment.
Shown is the baseline sample consisting of nonconfession criminal cases processed in
2005–9 (N 5 33,548 at time of decision and N 5 31,428 in month 60 after decision).
Dashed lines show 90% confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1315Looking at previously employed individuals in panel A of figure 8, we
see a different pattern. Incarceration has a negative effect on hours worked,
consistent with the drop in employment observed for this group. Interest-
ingly, the potential employment rate of the previously employed compliers
is fairly similar to that of the previously nonemployed compliers if they are
incarcerated (compare panels c and d in fig. B7). This suggests that incar-
ceration can take an individual who previously had almost no attachment
to the labor market and make them look like someone who also served
prison time but was previously employed.
Panels E and F of figure 8 repeat the same exercise but this time for cu-
mulative earnings. The general patterns found for employment and hours
of work are mirrored in these figures, as are the decompositions based on
potential outcomes in figure B6. Last, table 6 shows that differences in ob-
servable characteristics other than prior employment are not driving the
contrasting labor market effects for previously employed versus previously
nonemployed defendants.
One question is whether the positive cumulative effects found for the
previously nonemployed reflects initial boosts in employment and hours
associated with participation in a reentry program after release from
prison or whether the employment effects are more long-lasting. To as-
sess this, in panel A of table B13, we estimate year-by-year effects for em-
ployment outcomes in a given year. We find sizable and lasting effects of
incarceration on future employment for the previously nonemployed.
The table documents statistically significant increases in hours of work
in years 2–5. If anything, the effect grows larger with each passing year,
with estimates increasing from 115 more hours of work in year 1 to 734
more hours in year 5. Similar results are found for both ever employed
and earnings outcomes, although the ever employed estimates are more
imprecise. This suggests that we are estimating not simply the cumulative
impact of a short-term effect but rather a persistent employment effect.
These findings mirror what we see when looking at the intensive margins
of the cumulative number of hours and earnings over time in panels D
and F of figure 8.
A similar analysis is done for the previously employed in panel B of ta-
ble B13. The year-by-year estimates for this group are generally negative,
with the largest effect in the first year (consistent with them losing their job
while in prison) and smaller effects by year 5 (suggesting that they start to
recover by the end). The cumulative effects on hours and earnings in pan-
els C and E of figure 7 are another way to illustrate these negative effects.C. The Role of Job Loss and Job Training ProgramsThe differences in labor market effects depending on prior employment
are striking. For the previously employed group, the negative effects areThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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Allperhaps not unexpected, as these individuals had an actual job to lose by
going to prison. To test whether job loss is the explanation, we take
advantage of the fact that we can link firms to workers in our data. In par-
ticular, we follow the previously employed defendants from years 2–5TABLE 6







(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent Variable: Pr(Ever Employed)
Months 1–60 after decision Baseline Reweighted Baseline Reweighted
RF: judge stringency, all
controls 2.155*** 2.176*** .151** .210***
(.058) (.063) (.064) (.070)
IV: incarcerated, all controls 2.292** 2.327** .358** .490**
(.115) (.127) (.168) (.199)
Dependent mean .70 .72 .43 .44
Complier mean if not
incarcerated .82 .75 .13 .13
B. Dependent Variable: Cumulative Hours of Work
Months 1–60 after decision Baseline Reweighted Baseline Reweighted
RF: judge stringency, all
controls 2815.9 21,075.8* 1,019.1*** 1,385.9***
(507.3) (554.1) (364.9) (415.6)
IV: incarcerated, all controls 21,531.7 21,998.2* 2,413.1** 3,230.0**
(948.1) (1,048.1) (1,060.7) (1,289.9)
Dependent mean 3,804.2 4,063.7 1,514.3 1,613.8
Complier mean if not
incarcerated 4,410.7 3,838.3 51.4 47.8
C. Dependent Variable: Cumulative Earnings
Months 1–60 after decision Baseline Reweighted Baseline Reweighted
RF: judge stringency, all
controls 2151.0 2206.1 168.9** 254.2**
(146.0) (172.0) (73.7) (92.6)
IV: incarcerated, all controls 2283.5 2382.9 399.9* 592.4**
(272.6) (319.9) (206.1) (272.7)
Dependent mean 834.3 920.4 255.7 279.0
Complier mean if not
incarcerated 914.2 788.3 9.95 9.70This content downl
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1317after their court case (after virtually all incarcerated individuals should
be out of prison) and track whether their first employment, if any, during
this period was with the same firm as they worked in before the court case.
We then run two new IV regressions, quantifying the effect of incarcera-
tion on (1) the probability of being employed at a new firm and (2) the
chance of being employed at the previous firm. Column 1 in table B14
shows the overall employment effect in any firm, which is a 29 percentage
point drop due to incarceration. As shown in columns 2 and 3, the drop
in employment is almost entirely due to a reduction in the likelihood of
employment at the previous firm, whereas there is only a small and sta-
tistically insignificant effect of incarceration on the probability of em-
ployment at a new firm.
Individuals who were not working prior to incarceration had no job to
lose. However, serving time in prison could give access to educational and
job training programs both while in prison and immediately after.We col-
lected individual-level data on participation in a variety of job training
and classroom training programs. Themost common job training program
is on-the-job training in a regular or sheltered workplace, where the em-
ployer receives a temporary subsidy (normally up to 1 year) to train the
individual and expose them to different jobs. Job training is specifically
targeted to those whoneedwork experience in order to find employment.
It is often paired with job finding assistance, where a personal counselor
helps the individual find a suitable workplace and negotiate wages and
employment conditions. The classroom training programs include short
skill-focused courses, vocational training, and ordinary education. Class-
room training is limited to 10months for skill courses, 2 years for vocational
training, and 3 years for ordinary education. Thirty-three percent of the
previously nonemployed participate in job training, and 25% participate
in classroom training. In comparison, among the previously employed,
25% participate in job training and 25% in classroom training.
Table 7 reports IV estimates for both types of training using our judge
stringency instrument. We focus on the first 2 years after the court deci-
sion so as to capture the training while in prison and immediately after.
For the previously employed group, there are hints that participation in
both job and classroom training programs increases because of incarcer-
ation but nothing that is statistically significant. For the previously non-
employed group, there is likewise no statistically significant evidence for
an increase in classroom training, although the estimate is positive. In-
stead, what changes significantly as a result of incarceration is the proba-
bility that previously nonemployed defendants participate in job training
programs. We estimate that being incarcerated makes these individuals
35 percentage points more likely to attend a job training program. By
comparison, few if any of the previously nonemployed compliers would
have participated in job training programs if not incarcerated.This content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
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AllD. Putting the Pieces TogetherSo far, we have demonstrated that the decline in crime from incarcera-
tion is driven by individuals who were not working prior to incarceration.
Among these individuals, imprisonment increases participation in pro-
grams directed at improving employability and reducing recidivism and
ultimately raises employment and earnings while discouraging further
criminal behavior. A natural question is whether the people who, because
of incarceration, commit fewer crimes are the same individuals as those
who becomemore likely to participate in job training programs and work
more. Or does the decline in crime occur independently of the increase
in program participation and employment? We investigate this question
in table B15. In columns 2 and 3, we first break up the probability of re-
offending into the probability of reoffending and employed plus the prob-
ability of reoffending and not employed. Using the IV model, we report
estimates for how each of these joint probabilities are affected by incar-
ceration. As shown in column 2, there is little change in the joint proba-
bility of reoffending and employment due to incarceration. Instead, the
entire drop in recidivism appears to be driven by a reduction in the
joint probability of reoffending and not employed. The only conclusionTABLE 7
Effect of Incarceration on Participation in Job Training Programs and Classroom
























all controls .056 .073 .147** .054
(.063) (.065) (.063) (.067)
IV: incarcerated, all
controls .106 .138 .348** .127
(.118) (.122) (.168) (.164)
Dependent mean .17 .19 .22 .17
Complier mean if not
incarcerated .16 .18 .00 .04This conten
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incarceration, recidivism, and employment 1319consistent with all our estimates is that individuals who are induced to
start working are the same individuals who stop committing crimes.41
Going a step further, in columns 4 and 5, we estimate the joint proba-
bility of reoffending, employment, and job training. We find that the en-
tire drop in recidivism reported in column 1 is due to a reduction in the
joint probability of being charged, not employed, and not participating
in a job training program. We therefore conclude that the drop in crime
we find for the previously nonemployed is driven by the same individuals
who, because of incarceration, participate in job training and become
gainfully employed.VII. Implications for Cost-Benefit CalculationsA natural question is whether the positive effects from imprisonment
found in Norway pass a cost-benefit test. It is difficult to estimate the ben-
efits of crime reduction and the costs of imprisonment, with researchers
making strong assumptions and extrapolations to do so (see McCollister,
French, and Fang 2010; Garcia et al. 2017). With this caveat in mind, we
attempt a simple cost-benefit comparison. Our rough calculations sug-
gest the high rehabilitation expenditures in Norway are more than offset
by the corresponding benefits to society.
To calculate the costs of incarceration reported in table B16, we first
compute the direct daily cost per prisoner of incarceration. To do this,
we take the total prison spending reported by the Norwegian Correctional
Services divided by the total number of prison days served across all pris-
oners in 2013. This gives a direct prison cost of $323.50 per day. We then
create an outcome variable that multiplies the number of days spent in
prison for an individual’s current court case by $323.50. The IV estimate
that uses this outcome measure yields a cost of $60,515 per incarceration
sentence. We note that this measure captures the average cost of incar-
ceration, even though ideally one would like to use the marginal cost of
incarceration.
On the benefit side, there are three broad categories. First, there is a
reduction in criminal justice system expenditures due to fewer crimes be-
ing committed. Following the approach that McCollister, French, and41 To see this, let C denote crime, E denote employment, and I denote incarceration. By
definition, PðCÞ 5 P ðC \ EÞ 1 PðC \ not EÞ. We estimate that dPðCÞ=dI < 0 is driven by
dPðC \ not EÞ=dI < 0, since dPðC \ EÞ=dI ≈ 0. Notice that dPðC \ not EÞ=dI < 0 means
that some individuals with C 5 1, E 5 0 if I 5 0 change behavior if I 5 1. There are three
possibilities for change: (1) C 5 0, E 5 0; (2) C 5 1, E 5 1; and (3) C 5 0, E 5 1. How-
ever, type 1 is inconsistent with dPðEÞ=dI > 0, and type 2 is inconsistent with dPðCÞ=dI < 0.
Only type 3 is consistent with dPðEÞ=dI > 0, dPðCÞ=dI < 0, and dPðC \ not EÞ=dI < 0.
Note that this is an argument about net effects; while there may be some of types 1 and
2, they would have to be offset by even more of type 3.
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AllFang (2010) used for the United States, we calculate police savings per
crime avoided as total operating costs reported by the Norwegian Police
Service divided by the total number of reported crimes. Police savings are
computed to be $3,670 per reported crime. Likewise, we calculate court
savings as total operating costs reported by the Norwegian Courts, scaled
by the fraction of criminal cases in the courts, and then divided by the to-
tal number of criminal cases processed in 2013. Court savings are com-
puted to be $2,533 per court case. We then create an outcome variable
that takes the total number of crimes committed by an individual multi-
plied by $3,670 plus the total number of future court cases for an individ-
ual multiplied by $2,533. Using this combined criminal justice cost as the
outcome variable and our IV setup, we estimate a savings of $71,225 per
incarceration sentence.
The second category of benefits is due to increased employment, which
results in higher taxes paid and lower transfer payments. We estimate the
increase in taxes minus transfers to be $67,086 per incarceration sen-
tence using IV, although we note that this estimate is noisy. Net transfers
include all cash transfers received minus all income taxes paid over the
5-year period following the court decision. Either of these first two ben-
efit categories would justify the direct costs of prisons. Note that our cal-
culations cover only the 5 years after the court decision; any benefits in
the future would further add to the benefits (see Garcia et al. 2017).
The third benefit category is the reduction in victimization costs due to
fewer crimes being committed in the future. Victimization costs are noto-
riously difficult to estimate, so we instead simply note that this category
wouldmake the comparison of benefits versus costs evenmore favorable.
Of course, the importance of this category depends onwhether the avoided
crimes are serious from a welfare perspective. We lack the power to pre-
cisely estimate the decrease in the number of crimes for all crime types.
With this caveat in mind, we find that roughly 40% of the overall reduc-
tion is due to drops in property crime, with 4.3 fewer property crimes
(standard error is 2.1), and roughly 20% is due to fewer traffic violations
(estimate is22.4, standard error is 1.2). The remaining decrease is spread
across other crime types, such as violent crimes, drug crimes, and drunk
driving, but these estimates are not statistically significant.VIII. Concluding RemarksA pivotal point for prison policy was the 1974 Martinson report, which
concluded that nothingworks in rehabilitatingprisoners. Around this time,
incarceration rates started to rise dramatically, especially in the United
States, where they more than tripled as an increasing emphasis was placed
onpunishment and incapacitation. In recent years, researchers and policyThis content downloaded from 193.160.167.164 on March 27, 2020 02:40:28 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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genic or whether it can instead be preventive. Our study serves as a proof
of concept demonstrating that time spent in prison with a focus on reha-
bilitation can indeed be preventive. The Norwegian prison system is suc-
cessful in increasing participation in job training programs, encouraging
employment, and discouraging crime largely as a result of changes in the
behavior of individuals who were not working prior to incarceration.
While this paper establishes an important proof of concept, several im-
portant questions remain for future research. Our results do not imply
that prison is necessarily cost effective or preventative in all settings. Ev-
idence from other countries and populations would be useful to assess
the generalizability of our findings. Moreover, while we provide some ev-
idence that job training and employment are part of the story, it would
be interesting to quantify their effects more precisely as well as to analyze
other possible mechanisms, such as sentence lengths, prison conditions,
drug treatment programs, and postrelease support. Additional research
along these lines will aid policy makers as they tackle the challenging
task of prison reform.References
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